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A CURE FOR A “PUBLIC CONCERN”: WASHINGTON’S
NEW ANTI-SLAPP LAW
Tom Wyrwich
Abstract: In March 2010, the Washington State Legislature passed its Act Limiting
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. The new Act fills a critical void in
Washington’s protection of free expression and petition rights. The Washington Act protects
the free expression of Washington citizens by shielding them from meritless lawsuits
designed only to incur costs and chill future expression. This Comment offers interpretive
guidance for Washington courts by examining the new law, its legislative history, its
constitutional underpinnings, and its relationship to the influential California anti-SLAPP
statute on which it is modeled. Although the Washington Act shares many identical
provisions with the California statute, Washington’s Act does include important deviations
from the California model. This Comment embraces long-standing canons of statutory
construction to argue that the Washington Act’s deviations reveal a specific intent to reject
certain aspects of the California law. Among these specific rejections is the California law’s
broader coverage of protected free expression. While California protects expression related to
“issues of public interest,” the Washington Act protects expression related only to “issues of
public concern.” Washington courts interpreting this important provision should reject
California case law and embrace the “public concern” test established by the United States
Supreme Court in Connick v. Myers, a test that already occupies solid ground in Washington
case law.

INTRODUCTION
The right to speak on issues of public concern lies at the heart of the
freedom of speech.1 That freedom, guaranteed by both the federal and
Washington State constitutions,2 protects the right to criticize the
military draft,3 provides a shield for newspapers to publish classified
documents,4 and shelters from liability groups who choose to stage
peaceful boycotts.5 Despite these important protections of free

1. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.”).
3. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971) (holding that a vulgar phrase worn on a
jacket is protected speech).
4. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (rejecting prior restraint of
publication of Pentagon Papers).
5. See NAACP v. Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886, 889, 934 (1982) (reversing award of damages for
boycott of white merchants after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.).
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expression rights, the state and federal constitutions fail to protect
citizens from the exorbitant legal expense necessary to defend these
rights in court. It is this failure that the Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation (SLAPP) exploits.
Plaintiffs file SLAPPs to interfere with the protected free expression
of defendants.6 A SLAPP has little or no chance of success in the
courts.7 Even without a successful court judgment, though, a SLAPP
accomplishes an ulterior goal: forcing defendants who legally exercised
their constitutional rights of free expression into costly litigation that
chills their current and future involvement in public debate.8 Until July
2010, Washington provided few options to dismiss these frivolous
lawsuits.9
With the Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation (“the Act” or “the Washington Act”),10 Washington joined
a growing group of states—including, most notably, California—that
have extended anti-SLAPP protection to defend public exercises of free
expression.11 These laws allow individuals and companies, particularly
media organizations, to not only dismiss lawsuits intended to frustrate
their free expression rights, but also to secure attorney’s fees and
additional relief.12
Although the Washington Act is similar to California’s anti-SLAPP
statute, it is no mirror image.13 The Act’s legislative history, the
Washington State Constitution’s protection of free expression, and a
6. Kathryn W. Tate, California’s Anti-SLAPP Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary on its
Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 802–03 (2000) (SLAPPs “have the effect
of interfering with the defendants past or future exercise of constitutionally protected rights”).
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See Public Participation Lawsuits—Special Motion to Strike Claim, ch. 118, 2010 Wash. Sess.
Laws 921, 924 (“‘SLAPPs[] are typically dismissed as groundless or unconstitutional, but often not
before the defendants are put to great expense, harassment, and interruption of their productive
activities.”).
9. The Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation became law in
July 2010. See Public Participation Lawsuits—Special Motion to Strike Claim, ch. 118, 2010 Wash.
Sess. Laws 921.
10. Id.
11. E.g., Citizen Participation in Government Act, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to 16-63-508
(2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2006);
Citizen Participation Act, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/1 to 110/99 (West Supp. 2011); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 34-7-7-1 to 34-7-7-10 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971
(2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1443.1 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.150 (West Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 9-33-1 to 9-33-4 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041 (Supp. 2010).
12. See infra Part IV.C.
13. See infra Part IV.
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comparison of statutory texts of the Washington and California laws all
demonstrate that Washington courts should not interpret the two statutes
in lockstep.14 This Comment analyzes these sources and implores
Washington courts to pay special attention to provisions of the
California statute that the Washington State Legislature expressly
adopted, modified, or ignored.15
Part I of this Comment introduces the necessity of anti-SLAPP laws
to protect those who engage in acts of constitutional free expression. Part
II explains the evolution of the Washington State Legislature’s antiSLAPP statutory scheme, from its groundbreaking “Brenda Hill Bill” in
1989 to the passage of the new act in 2010. Part III explores the many
similarities between California’s influential anti-SLAPP statute and the
Washington Act. Part IV shows that, despite their many similarities, the
Washington Act includes important deviations from the California
model. Finally, Part V argues that long-standing canons of statutory
interpretation demonstrate that the Washington State Legislature, in
borrowing many provisions of the California statute, implicitly intended
to adopt those provisions and their corresponding case law. Likewise, by
modifying or ignoring certain California provisions, the Washington
State Legislature specifically intended to reject those provisions and
their judicial interpretations. In particular, the Washington State
Legislature rejected language from the California law defining the scope
of protected activities. While the California law protects speech related
to “issues of public interest,” the Washington Act protects only “issues
of public concern.” This explicit modification demonstrates the
Washington State Legislature’s intent to apply the “public concern” test
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Connick v. Myers,16 a test
that already occupies solid ground in Washington jurisprudence.
I.

SLAPPS FRUSTRATE THE RIGHT TO SPEAK AND
PETITION ON ISSUES OF PUBLIC CONCERN

The right to comment on issues of public concern occupies a central
position in First Amendment law.17 The right to participate in debate on
public issues derives not only from the Free Speech Clause, but also the
Petition Clause.18 The Petition Clause has been extended to cover
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Part V.
16. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
17. Schneck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 US 357, 377 (1997).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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petitions and “any peaceful, legal attempt” to influence government
action through any body—even the electorate.19 It is those fundamental
individual rights that a SLAPP aims to frustrate.
A.

SLAPPs Frustrate Public Participation by Creating Costly
Litigation for Defendants Speaking on Issues of Public Concern

The necessity for anti-SLAPP laws arises not out of the inability of
state and federal constitutions to protect free expression, but rather the
inefficiency with which the American judicial system provides that
constitutional protection. In a SLAPP, the plaintiff bases the lawsuit on
the defendant’s free expression activities.20 But unlike many reasonable
challenges to free speech, claims in a SLAPP lack merit.21 With no
concern for the inevitable failure of the lawsuit, a SLAPP forces
defendants—who have lawfully exercised their constitutional right of
expression or petition—into costly litigation that may chill the
defendant’s future participation in the public debate.22
After studying more than 240 cases, University of Denver Professors
George W. Pring and Penelope Canan coined the term “Strategic
Lawsuit Against Public Participation.”23 In each of the cases they
studied, the claim involved communications filed against
nongovernment individuals or organizations on an issue of public
interest or social significance.24 The cases involved not only lawsuits
traditionally associated with free speech, such as libel and defamation
suits, but other actions such as business interference, conspiracy, or
trespass.25
Because of the cost that it entails, the threat of lengthy litigation
becomes vital to a SLAPP’s effectiveness.26 Plaintiffs rarely win in court
but often realize their ultimate goal: to devastate the defendant
19. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 3, 211
(1996).
20. Tate, supra note 6, at 802–03.
21. Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPPback: The Misuse of Libel Law for
Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & POL. 417, 423–24 (1991). Both the
Washington and California anti-SLAPP statutes provide avenues for plaintiffs to prove their claim
has merit, even if it is directed at punishing or frustrating public participation. Compare WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.24.525(4)(b) (2010), with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(3) (West Supp. 2011).
22. See Metabolife Int’l, Inc., v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001).
23. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at vi.
24. Id. at 8–9.
25. Id. at 150–51.
26. See Wilbanks v. Wolk, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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financially and chill the defendant’s public involvement.27 Although
there are actions that a SLAPP defendant can take either during or after
litigation—a so-called SLAPPback28—courts have found that those
measures will likely do little to deter the plaintiff.29 The traditional
safeguards against meritless actions tend to have little effect because a
SLAPP filer may consider any sanction “as merely a cost of doing
business.”30
B.

The Case of Camer v. Seattle Post-Ingelligencer Demonstrates a
SLAPP’s Costly Impact

The case of Susan Goldberg demonstrates the damage a SLAPP can
inflict without anti-SLAPP legislation. In 1982, Goldberg worked as a
reporter for the Seattle Post-Intelligencer.31 On June 20, 1982, the
newspaper published her story, ‘Nuisance’ Suits Clog the Courts.32 The
story addressed what several Seattle attorneys viewed as an issue of
local concern: the effects and implications of pro se litigants filing
frivolous claims in county courts.33 The published article stated that,
“correctly or not,” area attorneys had leveled accusations that Dorothy
Camer and Margaret Coughlin had filed nuisance suits. 34 Both Camer
and Coughlin declined opportunities to speak with Goldberg for the
story.35 But on July 20, 1982, Camer and Coughlin alleged that the
article defamed them in their joint complaint for libel.36
The trial court and appellate court both held that the plaintiffs, as a
matter of law, did not present a valid claim for trial.37 Goldberg’s article
was “undoubtedly opinion and therefore not actionable.”38 But the trial
court did not dispose of the plaintiffs’ case until almost two years after
27. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at 29 (“Filers seldom win a legal victory—the normal
litigation goal—yet often achieve their goals in the real world.”).
28. Id. at 11, 123–24 (discussing how defendants can use a countersuit for malicious
prosecution).
29. See Wilbanks, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 500.
30. Id.
31. See Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wash. App. 29, 31, 723 P.2d 1195, 1197 (1986).
32. Susan Goldberg, ‘Nuisance’ Suits Clog the Courts, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 20,
1982, at A4.
33. Camer, 45 Wash. App. at 31–32, 723 P.2d at 1197–98.
34. Goldberg, supra note 32, at A4.
35. Camer, 45 Wash. App. at 35, 723 P.2d at 1199.
36. Id. at 32, 723 P.2d at 1198.
37. Id. at 44, 723 P.2d at 1204.
38. Id. at 41, 723 P.2d at 1202.
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the plaintiffs filed their complaint.39 The Washington Court of Appeals
did not announce its opinion until August 20, 1986—four years after the
original filing.40 Even though both courts considered the libel claim to be
meritless, the plaintiffs forced the Seattle Post-Intelligencer into court
for four years.41 Considering that defending a typical libel lawsuit costs
at least $20,000 to $50,000 merely to get through the initial rounds of
dismissal,42 the Seattle Post-Intelligencer’s victory was likely a costly
one.
The lawsuit against the Seattle Post-Intelligencer imposed more than
only financial costs. For four years, the Camer litigation forced
Goldberg and the Seattle Post-Intelligencer to defend their professional
reputations against charges of defamation and libel. The SLAPP
transformed a public debate—a discussion regarding the propriety of
“nuisance suits,” including those claims filed by the Camer plaintiffs—
into a private dispute in the state courts. Often, this role transformation,
in which the party legally acting within its rights must defend itself,
discourages future exercise of free expression rights.43 When Professors
Pring and Canan completed their study, they estimated that SLAPPs
likely resulted in thousands of citizens being “sued into silence.”44
Without laws to protect those engaged in public participation, SLAPP
filers can freely use litigation to discourage their opposition.
II.

WASHINGTON’S PROTECTION OF PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION HAS SLOWLY EVOLVED FROM THE
NATION’S FIRST ANTI-SLAPP LAW

Recognizing the dangerous effect of SLAPP lawsuits on free
expression, Washington became the first state to pass an anti-SLAPP
law with its “Brenda Hill Bill” in 1989. The landmark law protected
defendants against frivolous lawsuits challenging the defendants’ lawful
communication with government agencies. Thirteen years later, the
39. Id. at 32–33, 723 P.2d at 1198. The complaint was dismissed on May 7, 1984. Id. at 33, 723
P.2d at 1198.
40. Id. at 29, 723 P.2d at 1195.
41. The appellate court did not consider awarding attorney’s fees to the Post-Intelligencer. See id.
42. Rachel Smolkin, Cities Without Newspapers?, AM. JOURNALISM REV., June/July 2009, at 16,
25. The Post-Intelligencer shut down its print publication on March 17, 2009, after losing $14
million the previous year. Dan Richman & Andrea James, Seattle P-I to Publish Last Edition
Tuesday, SEATTLEPI.COM (Mar. 16, 2009, 10:00 PM), www.seattlepi.com/business/403793_piclosur
e17.html.
43. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at 29.
44. Id. at 3.

WLR_October_Wyrwich_Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2011]

WASHINGTON’S ANTI-SLAPP LAW

11/2/2011 2:02 PM

669

Washington State Legislature recognized a need to enhance this limited
protection. In a 2002 amendment, the legislature strengthened the
penalties for filing a SLAPP and also provided courts better guidance for
early SLAPP dismissal.
A.

With the “Brenda Hill Bill,” the Nation’s First Anti-SLAPP Law,
Washington Protected Citizens’ Communication with Government
Bodies

Washington passed its first anti-SLAPP legislation in 1989.45 The
legislature enacted the bill in response to the efforts of a young
Washington mother named Brenda Hill. After discovering that her real
estate company owed the state hundreds of thousands of dollars in
unpaid taxes, Hill reported the company to the state government.46 In
retaliation for this lawful act, the real estate company sued and harassed
Hill to the point of bankruptcy.47 After Hill picketed the capitol steps and
received favorable media attention, the Washington State Legislature
introduced a bill to provide relief to victims of similarly vindictive
lawsuits.48 The law, known as the “Brenda Hill Bill,”49 provided
immunity from civil liability for claims based on good-faith
communication with the government regarding any matter “reasonably
of concern.”50 The law was America’s first modern anti-SLAPP law.51
The Brenda Hill Bill was not without defects. Notably, it provided no
method for early dismissal.52 With courts unable to dismiss SLAPPs
before discovery, defendants had no means of escaping the significant
legal expenses SLAPPs intend to inflict.53 Additionally, the requirement
45. Act of May 5, 1989, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 1119.
46. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at 130.
47. Id. at 130–31. The real estate company, in retaliation, filed for foreclosure on Hill’s home,
filed a $1,000,000 defamation claim, and put a gag order on the Hills. Id. The president of the
company went so far so say “we’re going to get every last nickel she has.” Id. at 131 (quoting
Walter Hatch, Dream Home Is Couple’s Nightmare, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 10, 1988, at D1). For
years, Brenda Hill felt as if the government had abandoned her in her fight. She received little
support in defending the company’s lawsuits. The Hills’ homeowners insurance was canceled; they
had to file for bankruptcy to protect their home. Id. at 130.
48. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at 132.
49. Id. at 192.
50. Act of May 5, 1989, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 1119–20.
51. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at 191.
52. See Michael Eric Johnston, A Better SLAPP Trap: Washington State’s Enhanced Statutory
Protection for Targets of “Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation,” 38 GONZ. L. REV. 263,
284–85 (2003).
53. See id. at 284.
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of “good faith” only increased the need for a factual inquiry.54 The need
to resolve factual issues often dragged defendants through litigation for
years, muting the law’s intended effects.55
B.

In a 2002 Amendment, Washington Expanded Protection to the
Right of Petition, but Not All Exercises of the Right of Expression

In 2002, the Washington State Legislature amended the law to help
cure several of the Brenda Hill Bill’s defects.56 The legislature removed
the “good faith” requirement as an element of a SLAPP defense,
effectively granting immunity to all protected activity, regardless of the
defendant’s intent.57 The amendment also authorized courts to award
statutory damages of $10,000 to the defendants, although courts could
deny that award if they found the defendants acted in bad faith.58 The
legislature also instructed the courts that it intended the law to provide
“clear rules for early dismissal review.”59
Like the Brenda Hill Bill before it, however, the 2002 amendment
was not without defects. The amendment limited itself to communication
with the government and self-regulatory organizations.60 For example,
the amendment would not apply to a newspaper article.61 Like the
Brenda Hill Bill before it, the amended statute applied only to dismiss
“a civil action for damages,” and not to claims for injunctive relief, such
as a temporary restraining order.62 And although the availability of a
$10,000 award of damages might deter SLAPPs in some situations, it
hurt SLAPP defendants in others; the burden of fighting a challenge that

54. See id.
55. Id. at 284–85.
56. Act of March 28, 2002, 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 1057.
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2010); Johnston, supra note 52, at 285–86.
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510.
59. 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 1057.
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510.
61. The statute does not include the electorate as a branch of the government, so communication
with the electorate in a newspaper article, similar to the subject of the Camer litigation, would not
receive protection. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510.
62. Emmerson v. Weilep, 126 Wash. App. 930, 936–37, 110 P.3d 214, 216–17 (2005) (quoting
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.500). In Emmerson, a Spokane city code enforcement officer received a
restraining order from a resident who made several complaints regarding a neighbor’s land use, and
then made complaints to the Spokane City council, City administrator, and police department
regarding the officer’s investigation. Emmerson, 126 Wash. App. at 933–34, 110 P.3d at 215–16.
Without specifically addressing whether the defendant’s activity was protected, the court held that
the anti-SLAPP motion did not apply because the officer had not made a claim for damages. Id. at
937, 110 P.3d at 217.
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the defendant acted in bad faith had the potential to lengthen litigation to
the point of reducing the SLAPP defense’s efficiency.63 These defects
continued to plague Washington SLAPP defendants until the legislature
authored its new California-style anti-SLAPP law in 2010.
III. THE 2010 WASHINGTON ANTI-SLAPP ACT CLOSELY
MIRRORS CALIFORNIA’S, AND COURTS HAVE
INTERPRETED THEM SIMILARLY
Even as Washington amended its state law in 2002 to provide more
protection for those petitioning the government, other state legislatures
had already enacted anti-SLAPP laws that went further. In 1992, after
two previous attempts to pass an anti-SLAPP law,64 California passed a
law that went well beyond petitioning. The law, a procedural motion to
strike a claim, protects exercises of the right to petition and the right of
free speech “in connection with a public issue.”65 The California law
allows plaintiffs to proceed past the motion to strike if they can prove “a
probability” that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.66 Several states
soon followed suit: by 2010, ten states had followed California’s lead in
protecting both the exercise of the right of free speech and the right to
petition.67 Washington joined those states when it passed the Act in
2010.68
Governor Christine Gregoire signed the Washington Act Limiting
Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation into law on March 18,
2010, just two months after it first appeared before the State Senate
Judiciary Committee.69 The Act went into effect June 10, 2010.70 The
bill did not have a particularly long or dramatic history. Between the
original bill that first appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee71

63. Johnston, supra note 52, at 288.
64. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at 196.
65. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2011).
66. Id.
67. See statutes cited supra note 11.
68. Public Participation Lawsuits—Special Motion to Strike Claim, ch. 118, 2010 Wash. Sess.
Laws 921, 924.
69. See History of Bill, Senate Bill 6395, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE,
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/summary.aspx?bill=6395&year=2009 (last visited Aug. 2, 2011).
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525 (2011).
71. See
S.B.
6395,
61st
Leg.,
1st
Sess.
(Wash.
2010),
available
at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2009-10/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/6395.pdf (last visited
Aug. 2, 2011). State senators Adam Kline, Claudia Kauffman, and Jeanne Kohl-Welles sponsored
the bill. Id. at 1.
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and the final law,72 the bill underwent only one substantive change,
which related to the relief for defeating a frivolously filed anti-SLAPP
motion.73 Otherwise, the Act passed by unanimous consent with no floor
debate in either the state house or senate.74
The Washington Act bears a close resemblance to the California law,
and courts have taken notice. An analysis of the texts reveals several
similar provisions, starting with their instruction that courts interpret the
statutes broadly and continuing with their parallel structure and common
terms of art. Additionally, the two statutes protect the same essential
constitutional right. With these similarities in mind, courts have begun
using California law to interpret the Washington Act.
A.

The Two Statutes Include Many Similar Provisions

The similarities between the California statute and the Washington
Act begin with the two statutes’ common directive that courts construe
them broadly. The similarities continue with the statutes’ parallel
procedural structure, and their required stay of discovery. Finally, the
two laws use identical terms to describe the protected activity.
1.

Both Statutes Instruct Courts to Construe Them Broadly

The California State Legislature encourages broad construction of its
anti-SLAPP statute. When it enacted the statute, the legislature found “a
disturbing increase” in lawsuits initiated primarily to chill public
participation,75 and it declared that SLAPPs represented an “abuse of the
judicial process.”76 In a 1997 amendment to the statute,77 the California
State Legislature added language requiring that the law be broadly
construed.78 This sentence has had a tremendous effect on the statute’s

72. 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 921.
73. The original bill did not allow for plaintiffs to obtain relief exceeding $10,000 for a
frivolously filed motion. At least one committee member worried that the law’s sword was not
equally sharp on both edges, providing more protection to those who frivolously file anti-SLAPP
motion than those who frivolously file SLAPPs. See Proposed Substitute to Senate Bill 6395,
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/CMD/showdoc.ashx?u=A2iGB9PMbwyP2X1C%2bw7qdVoo636n00r/Ah88
8keMqQ2FVbQNr8ngp%2btO06aTJMdgMg53kw5bRK5IsDdB/3g6WwwhGtPDHT/P&y=2010
(last visited on Aug. 2, 2011).
74. See History of Bill, Senate Bill 6395, supra note 69.
75. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West Supp. 2011).
76. Id.
77. Tate, supra note 6, at 816.
78. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a). The legislature amended the law to include this statement
in 1997 to react to what had been a narrow interpretation of the statute in its genesis. See Tate, supra
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interpretation, particularly in determining those activities that the law
protects.79 Courts use this provision to resolve difficult questions in
favor of providing a broad right of recovery.80
Similarly, the Washington Act requires that courts apply and construe
the law liberally “to effectuate its general purpose of protecting
participants in public controversies from an abusive use of the courts.”81
The Washington Act expresses concern about lawsuits initiated
primarily to chill the constitutional rights of free speech and petition, and
also reasons that expedited judicial review will “avoid the potential for
abuse in these cases.”82
2.

Both Statutes Provide a Procedural Remedy for SLAPP Defendants

The procedural remedy that the California law provides has proven to
be “a potent weapon for defendants.”83 The California statute applies to
claims arising out of exercises of the right of petition and the right of
free speech “in connection with a public issue.”84 The California statute
focuses “not [on] the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather,
[on] the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted

note 6, at 823–24. Prior to the amendment, courts had narrowed the application only to activities
“closely tied to the right to petition and the freedom of speech.” Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc. v.
Investors Arbitration Servs., Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Zhao v.
Wong, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 909, 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). One study found that in the first year-anda-half, twenty-two of forty-nine anti-SLAPP motions failed. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at
198.
79. Tate, supra note 6, at 826–27 (stating that the “spirit of the statute’s mandate of broad
construction” affects courts’ approaches).
80. See, e.g., Dowling v. Zimmerman, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (stating
that the “purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute will be promoted by construing that statute broadly to
permit a pro se SLAPP defendant” to recover fees); Lam v. Ngo, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, 584–85
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that “[b]ecause the Legislature has specified that [§425.16] is to be
construed broadly,” filing deadlines start fresh with amended complaint); Damon v. Ocean Hills
Journalism Club, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“Given the mandate that we
broadly construe the anti-SLAPP statute, a single publication does not lose its ‘public forum’
character merely because it does not provide a balanced point of view.”); see also Jerome I. Braun,
California’s Anti-SLAPP Remedy After Eleven Years, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 731, 740 (2003)
(“This statement of legislative intent has permitted resolution of many knotty problems and has
been explicitly relied on by a significant number of courts as a key to their decisions.”)
81. Public Participation Lawsuits—Special Motion to Strike Claim, ch. 118, 2010 Wash. Sess.
Laws 921, 924.
82. Id. at 921.
83. 2 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS §
16.2.2, at 16–6 (3d ed. 2009).
84. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2011).
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liability.”85 Therefore, California courts first ask whether the claim is
based on an activity of the defendant that constitutes protected speech or
petitioning.86 The plaintiff’s claim must “arise from” the activity; merely
because a claim has been filed at some time after the defendant engaged
in such an act will not invoke anti-SLAPP protection.87
Should a defendant filing an anti-SLAPP motion prove to the court
that the claim arises out of protected activity, it has cleared only the first
hurdle. Next, the plaintiff has the opportunity to establish, through the
pleadings and affidavits,88 that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.89
The Washington Act follows the same structure to provide the
identical procedural remedy. The Washington Act applies “to any claim,
however characterized, that is based on an action involving public
participation and petition.”90 Should a Washington defendant prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the Washington Act applies, the
burden then shifts to the SLAPP filer to establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, a probability of prevailing on the claim.91 If the
SLAPP filer cannot meet that burden, then not only must the court strike
the complaint, but the court must also award attorney’s fees, a $10,000
damage award, and any additional relief to “deter repetition of the
conduct and comparable conduct by others similarly situated.”92 If the
SLAPP filer succeeds in demonstrating a probability of prevailing on the
claim, that determination may not be admitted into evidence later in the
case, and it has no effect on the burden of proof in the underlying
claim.93
3.

Both Statutes Require the Court to Stay Discovery Unless the
Plaintiff Can Demonstrate “Good Cause”
California law addressed one of the primary weapons of SLAPPs—

85. Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 711 (Cal. 2002).
86. Id.
87. See City of Cotati v. Cashman, 52 P.3d 695, 700 (Cal. 2002).
88. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(2) (West Supp. 2011). California courts require that the
evidence submitted also be admissible at trial. See Salma v. Capon, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 873, 884 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008) (citing Evans v. Unkow, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624, 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)).
89. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1).
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2) (2011).
91. § 4.24.525(4)(b).
92. § 4.24.525(6)(a).
93. § 4.24.525(4)(d).
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the high costs of discovery before dismissal94—by including a statutory
provision that stays discovery upon filing of an anti-SLAPP motion.95
The stay goes into effect until the “notice of [an] entry of [an] order
ruling on the motion,” and a plaintiff may only circumvent the stay by
moving, with good cause, to conduct specified discovery.96
The discovery stay allows a defendant served with a complaint arising
from protected activity to “put the plaintiff to his or her proof before the
plaintiff can conduct discovery.”97 Because the statute’s design promotes
the “fast and inexpensive unmasking and dismissal of SLAPPs,”98
California courts require plaintiffs to overcome a high burden to prove
good cause.99 To satisfy the good cause standard, the plaintiff must make
a timely showing that the defendant, or its agents and employees, knows
or holds evidence that would defeat the defendant’s anti-SLAPP
motion.100 Even if discovery is granted, parties must limit discovery to
the issues raised in the anti-SLAPP motion101 and must go to an issue
that the plaintiff should not be able to establish without discovery.102 For
example, in a defamation case, it would not be enough for the plaintiff to
request discovery to prove that a statement was false, or that the
statement was published, because the plaintiff should be able to prove
falsity or publication without discovery.103
The Washington Act includes a similar discovery stay. It requires that
a court stay all discovery as well as any pending hearings or motions
until it has ruled on the anti-SLAPP motion.104 The only way to defeat
this stay under the Washington Act is if the court orders further
discovery “for good cause shown.”105
94. See supra Part II.
95. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (West Supp. 2011).
96. Id.
97. Price v. Stossel, 590 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1268 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Rogers v. Home
Shopping Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973, 980 (C.D. Cal. 1999)).
98. Wilcox v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
99. See Ludwig v. Super. Ct., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“The legislative
intent is best served by an interpretation which would require a plaintiff to marshal facts sufficient
to show the viability of the action before filing a SLAPP suit.” (emphasis in original)).
100. See Price, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1266 (citing Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g
Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)).
101. Nguyen-Lam v. Cao, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Slauson P’ship
v. Ochoa, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 668, 680 (2003)).
102. See, e.g., Paterno v. Super. Ct., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 244, 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
103. Id.
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2) (2011).
105. § 4.24.525(5)(C).
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The discovery stay is one of three important provisions in the
Washington Act that deter the lengthy, costly litigation that often makes
SLAPPs so devastating. Additionally, a court must hold a hearing on an
anti-SLAPP motion no more than thirty days after service106 and it must
announce its ruling within seven days of the hearing.107 Together, these
provisions provide courts the ability to swiftly dismiss meritless claims
with minimal cost to the defendant. Hence, the same complaint that took
four years for the Seattle Post-Intelligencer to completely dispose of
could potentially be dismissed, with no further discovery, in no more
than thirty-seven days.
4.

Both Statutes Protect Statements Made in “Official Proceedings”

Both the California anti-SLAPP statute and the Washington Act
protect statements made in “official proceedings.”108 The question of
whether an activity involves an official proceeding may often be a
threshold question to determining whether California’s anti-SLAPP
statute applies,109 so California courts must often draw difficult lines in
deciding what constitutes an official proceeding authorized by law.110
Although the statute plainly applies to court hearings111 and
administrative proceedings,112 private proceedings held under the
influence of the state present difficult cases for the courts.113 Often, the
level of government entanglement involved in the event holds significant

106. § 4.24.525(5)(a). The provision does include a clause that allows for a later hearing if the
“docket conditions of the court require [it].” Id. However, “such hearings should receive priority.”
Id.
107. § 4.24.525(5)(b). This provision provides no route for a court to escape this requirement. Id.
108. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(2), with WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2).
109. In California, this may particularly be the case if the activity does not involve a public issue.
110. See A.F. Brown Elec. Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Elec. Supply, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 10
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that stop notice and other collection efforts did not constitute an
official proceeding). But cf. Kibler v. N. Inyo Cnty. Local Hosp. Dist., 138 P.3d 193, 199–200 (Cal.
2006) (holding that peer medical review meeting was an official proceeding). Even if a court finds
that a proceeding is an official proceeding, the defendant must still prove that his or her activity
constituted a statement or writing related to the official proceeding. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
425.16(e)(2).
111. See Rohde v. Wolf, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 348, 353–54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). An anti-SLAPP
claim based on communications in court differs from the litigation privilege, which may still be
relevant in establishing the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing. See Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 17
(Cal. 2006) (holding that litigation privilege and anti-SLAPP statute are “substantively different
statutes that serve quite different purposes”); Rohde, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 356.
112. See Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 2010).
113. See infra text accompanying notes 116–121.
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sway.114
The California Supreme Court has analyzed several factors in
determining if a proceeding is official under the statute: whether the
proceeding is required under California law; whether results of a
proceeding must be reported to a government authority; whether the
proceeding plays a role in the public welfare; and whether the decisions
made in a proceeding are subject to judicial review.115 Using those
factors, the Court determined that the statute applied to a hospital peer
review proceeding, which the state required the hospital to report and
which allowed for judicial review.116 Other proceedings held to apply
under the statute include statutorily mandated arbitration,117 and a public
review hearing conducted by a government agency.118 Conversely,
California courts have held that the following do not constitute an
official proceeding: a “ministerial event” such as a sheriff’s auction,119 a
nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding,120 and a collection effort made by a
supplier against a contractor.121
The Washington Act also protects statements made in official
proceedings and in connection with issues before an official
proceeding.122 The statutory language is similar to the California
statute,123 but Washington courts have not yet had an opportunity to
define what an official proceeding is in the context of the statute.
5.

Both Statutes Protect Statements Made in Public Forums

The California anti-SLAPP statute protects statements made in a
“public forum,” but the California courts do not define that term in
lockstep with the First Amendment. In First Amendment law, a public
114. Compare Kibler, 138 P.3d at 200 (holding hospital peer medical review subject to
administrative mandate and therefore is “quasi-judicial”), with Garretson v. Post, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d
230, 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding not an official
proceeding because it was “not closely linked to any governmental . . . proceedings or regulation”).
115. Kibler, 138 P.3d at 200 (interpreting the judicial review factor, “the Legislature has accorded
a hospital’s peer review decisions a status comparable to that of quasi-judicial public agencies[]”).
116. Id. at 199–200.
117. See Mallard v. Progressive Choice Ins. Co., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 487, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
118. Dixon v. Super. Ct., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 744 n.11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
119. See Blackburn v. Brady, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696, 701 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
120. See Garretson v. Post, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
121. A.F. Brown Elec. Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Elec. Supply, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 9 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006).
122. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2) (2011). Additionally, the statute protects statements made
in an effort to have a government body or official proceeding consider the issue. Id.
123. Compare id., with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 2011).
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forum refers to either a place historically associated with open public
debate—a street, sidewalk, or park—or a place designated for expressive
activity.124 The California courts, though, have interpreted “public
forum” more broadly in the context of the anti-SLAPP statute.125
To determine whether a public forum exists in the context of the
statute, California courts ask whether the forum is a place126 where
information is freely exchanged.127 By broadly construing the term as the
legislature directed, California courts have determined that websites,128
newspapers,129 magazines,130 call-in radio talk shows,131 and a
homeowners association’s board meeting and newsletter132 qualify as
public forums for the purpose of the statute.
Like the California statute, the Washington Act protects statements
made in public forums.133 Washington courts have not yet had an
opportunity to define a public forum in the context of the statute.

124. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also Zhao v.
Wong, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (“The term ‘public forum’ . . . refers typically
to those places historically associated with First Amendment activities, such as streets, sidewalks
and parks.”). Before the legislature amended the California statute in 1997 to encourage a broad
construction of the statute, the California courts interpreted the term “public forum” consistently
with First Amendment case law. See Zhao, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916.
125. See Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 212 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000).
126. Computer Xpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
127. See Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Database, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 48, 55 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007). This includes forms of communications that come at a cost, such as newspapers and
magazines. See Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(holding that these forms of communication are public). The court found that a broad reading
“comports with the fundamental purpose underlying the anti-SLAPP statute, which seeks to protect
against ‘lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights’ and ‘abuse of
the judicial process.’” Id. at 217 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a)).
128. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 514 n.4 (Cal. 2006) (“Web sites accessible to the
public . . . are ‘public forums’ for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.”); Kronemyer, 59 Cal. Rptr.
3d 48, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (Internet Movie Database, which provides information concerning
film and television to 35 million visitors monthly, is a public forum); Vogel v. Felice, 26 Cal. Rptr.
3d 350, 353, 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (defendant’s Web site listing plaintiffs as Nos. 1 and 2 on list
of “Top Ten Dumb Asses” is a public forum).
129. See Nygård, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 218.
130. See id.
131. See Ingels v. Westwood One Broad. Servs., Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 933, 941 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005).
132. See Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 210, 212 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000).
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2)(d) (2011).

WLR_October_Wyrwich_Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2011]
B.

WASHINGTON’S ANTI-SLAPP LAW

11/2/2011 2:02 PM

679

Washington’s Broad Constitutional Right to Free Speech, the Right
the Washington Act Protects, Originates from the California State
Constitution

Both the Washington Act and the California anti-SLAPP statute
protect against lawsuits targeted at lawful exercises of the right of
petition and the right of free speech on issues of public concern. Those
rights derive not only from the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution but also from the respective state constitutions.
The free speech provision of the Washington State Constitution, like
the Washington Act itself, is derived from the California State
Constitution.134 The drafters of the Washington State Constitution
surveyed the free speech laws of many states and elected to provide an
affirmative right to free speech, rather than the state-action limitation
seen in both the U.S. Constitution and the Oregon State Constitution.135
When the drafters formalized the Washington State Constitution, they
included a guarantee of free speech that mostly mirrored the California
provision.136
Washington State’s constitutional guarantee of free speech is broader
than its federal counterpart. Whereas the U.S. Constitution, as a general
rule, only forbids state action to abridge free speech,137 the Washington
State Constitution includes no such explicit requirement: “[e]very person
may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that right.”138 Washington courts consider this right to be

134. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 19 (2002).
135. Robert F. Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and Publish Freely: State Constitutional
Protection Against Private Abridgment, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 157, 172–73, 177 (1985).
136. See id. at 177. Compare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1879, amended 1980), with WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 5. The Washington drafters made one change from the California constitution, although the
drafters likely did not see the change as affecting the right provided. Utter, supra note 135, at 177
n.94. Washington elected not to include California’s additional clause that “no law shall be passed
to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or the press.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1879, amended
1980). It is likely that the Washington drafters thought that the clause was redundant; the
affirmative right necessarily includes the prohibition against state limitation of the right. Utter,
supra note 135, at 177 n.94.
137. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976) (restricting the First and Fourteenth
Amendment’s safeguards to state action). But see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509–10 (1946)
(holding that a privately-owned city that opens up its roads to the public is subject to First
Amendment restrictions).
138. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5. See also David M. Skover, The Washington Constitutional “State
Action” Doctrine: A Fundamental Right to State Action, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 221, 282
(1985) (“Since the ‘state action’ doctrine fulfills no instrumental or normative function appropriate
to state constitutional law decision-making, its abandonment is dictated by reason.”).
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more expansive than the right granted by the U.S. Constitution.139 The
state constitution’s right of petition does not qualitatively differ from the
right the U.S. Constitution protects.140 Under both, no government actor
may abridge the right to petition the government.141
C.

Federal Courts Have Relied on California Case Law in Early
Interpretations of the Washington Act

Because the Washington Act only went into effect in June 2010,
defendants have filed few anti-SLAPP motions under the Washington
Act. Federal district courts in Washington, rather than Washington state
courts, have been the first to issue opinions interpreting the Washington
Act.142 These early decisions have revealed a heavy reliance on
California statutory and case law.143
In Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog Films, Inc.,144 Washington resident Ken
Aronson sued controversial documentarian Michael Moore145 for using
Aronson’s likeness, voice, and song from video footage Aronson shot in
England in Moore’s health care documentary Sicko.146 Moore responded

139. See Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 243–44, 635 P.2d 108,
115–16 (1981).
140. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I, with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 4. See also Richmond v.
Thompson, 901 P.2d 371, 376 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the state provision is usually
interpreted “in harmony” with the First Amendment).
141. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 4.
142. See Arata v. City of Seattle, No. C10-1551(RSL), 2011 WL 248200 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 15,
2011); Castello v. City of Seattle, No. C10-1457(MJP), 2010 WL 4857022 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 22,
2010); Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog Films, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Nguyen v.
Clark Cnty., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
143. Only one court that has made an anti-SLAPP decision since the Washington Act became law
has recognized the differences between the California and Washington statutes. See N.Y. Studio,
Inc., v. Better Bus. Bureau of Ala., Or., and W. Wash., No. 3:11-cv-05012(RBL), 2011 WL
2414452, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2011) (discussing Washington’s stronger burden of proof to
survive an anti-SLAPP motion).
144. 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
145. Moore is well-known for the gun-control documentary Bowling for Columbine and the Iraq
War documentary Fahrenheit 9/11, among others.
146. SICKO (Dog Eat Dog Films 2007). The film claims to portray “the crazy and sometimes
cruel U.S. health care system, told from the vantage of everyday people faced with extraordinary
and bizarre challenges in their quest for basic health coverage.” Michael Moore, Film: Sicko,
MICHAELMOORE.COM, http://www.michaelmoore.com/books-films/sicko (last visited Aug. 5,
2011). The film features Eric Turnbow, a friend of Aronson’s, who injured his shoulder as he
attempted to cross Abbey Road walking on his hands and received care in an English hospital.
Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike at 3, Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog, 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (2010)
(No. 3:10CV-05293-KLS), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/washingt
on/wawdce/3:2010cv05293/167337/15/.
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by filing an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Aronson’s lawsuit.147
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington
looked to California case law, after it reasoned that the Washington Act
“mirrors” the California provision.148 The court held that Sicko
undisputedly addressed an issue of public concern.149 The court noted,
however, after analyzing other California cases, that even if an overall
work addresses issues of public concern, it is possible for exercises of
free speech within that work to fall outside of the statute’s protection.150
Even though Moore “involuntarily thrust” Aronson into the health care
discussion, Aronson’s appearance in the film “directly connected to the
discussion of the healthcare system.”151 Therefore, Moore met his
burden of proving that the statute applied to his activities.152 The court
then examined Aronson’s claims to see if he had a probability of
prevailing, and concluded that the claims were either barred by the First
Amendment,153 preempted by the Copyright Act,154 or lacked merit.155
The court awarded Moore attorney’s fees and the statutory award of
$10,000.156
In a second case before the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Castello v. City of Seattle,157 a Seattle paramedic
filed a suit against several city firefighters and paramedics for
defamation.158 The defendants had previously filed complaints with the
city and spoken to a television station about the plaintiff’s harassing
conduct.159 The court acknowledged Aronson’s reliance on California

147. Aronson, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 1107–08.
148. Id. at 1110.
149. Id. at 1111. The court declined to interpret the Washington State Legislature’s intent in
applying the Washington Act to issues “of public concern,” rather than to “public issue[s]” or
“issue[s] of public interest.” See infra Part IV.A.
150. Id. at 1112. The court relied on a California case in which a court found that even though the
film Reality Bites addressed issues of public concern, the activity on which the lawsuit was based
(the use of the plaintiff’s likeness in creating one of the film’s characters) did not. Dyer v.
Childress, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
151. Aronson, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
152. Id. at 1112.
153. Id. at 1114.
154. Id. at 1116.
155. See id. at 1116–17.
156. Id. at 1117.
157. No. C10-1457(MJP), 2010 WL 4857022 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 22, 2010).
158. Id. at *1.
159. Id. at *2. The news story was about low morale in the fire department. The defendants never
mentioned the plaintiff by name in the story.
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law and also used California case law as “persuasive authority” to
determine whether the defendants successfully proved that the statute
protected their activity.160 Using California case law as a guide,161 the
court determined that the television broadcast constituted a public forum
for the purposes of the Washington Act.162
IV. DESPITE THEIR CLOSE RESEMBLANCE, THE
WASHINGTON ACT AND THE CALIFORNIA ANTI-SLAPP
STATUTE HAVE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES
The Washington State Legislature did not copy the California antiSLAPP statute verbatim when it drafted the Act. The Washington Act
differs in several respects. Most significantly, the Washington Act chose
not to adopt California’s protection of statements relating to an issue of
“public interest,” and instead protected issues of “public concern,” a
phrase with which Washington courts are already familiar. Additionally,
the Washington Act does not include two exceptions in the California
anti-SLAPP statute, and the Washington Act punishes SLAPP filers
more severely than does the California statute.
A.

The Washington Act’s Protection of Statements Relating to an
“Issue of Public Concern” Differs from the California Statute’s
Protection of Statements Relating to a “Public Issue” or an “Issue
of Public Interest”

One difference between the statutes might be the most important in
determining the breadth of the Act’s scope. Instead of applying
protection to certain activities in connection with “an issue of public
interest,”163 as California does, the Washington Act applies to the same
activities in connection with “an issue of public concern.”164

160. Id. at *4.
161. Id. at *6 (citing Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 215–18 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008), which held that a city newspaper is a public forum under California anti-SLAPP statute). The
Castello court found “no meaningful distinction” between a newspaper and a local news broadcast
for the purpose of the statute. 2010 WL 4857022 at *6.
162. Id. at *6. The court concluded that “the emotional and psychological stability of an
emergency medical worker is ‘an issue of public concern.’” Id. The court, like the Aronson court,
declined to interpret the Washington State Legislature’s intent in applying the Washington Act to
statements related to issues “of public concern.” See infra Part V.B (discussing the Washington
Act’s application to statements related to issues of public concern).
163. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West Supp. 2011) (emphasis added).
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2) (2011) (emphasis added).
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California Courts Emphasize Whether an Issue Has Received
Widespread Attention in Determining What Constitutes an “Issue
of Public Interest”

California’s anti-SLAPP statute protects lawful speech “in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”165 This phrase, in
conjunction with the legislature’s request that courts construe the statute
broadly,166 has extended the anti-SLAPP statute to provide protection for
the producers of the “raunchy, satirical comedy” Borat,167 for a tabloid
magazine’s stories concerning the sex life of pop singer Britney
Spears,168 for a website discussing the movie My Big Fat Greek
Wedding,169 and for unlicensed representations of famous heiress Paris
Hilton.170 Two prominent tests have emerged from California appellate
courts to determine which issues are “public” or “of public interest”: the
Rivero and Weinberg tests.171
Under the test established in Rivero v. American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees,172 courts discern whether an issue
falls into one of three categories of cases: (1) statements that “concerned
a person or entity in the public eye”; (2) “conduct that could directly
affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants”; or (3) a
“topic of widespread, public interest.”173
Courts that apply the test formulated in Weinberg v. Feisel,174 decided
165. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(3)–(4). Although the California State Legislature, unlike
Washington, did not specify that the conduct must be lawful, the California courts have held that the
statute does not apply to illegal conduct. See, e.g., Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d
864, 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
166. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a).
167. Jonathan Segal, Anti-SLAPP Law Make Benefit for Glorious Entertainment Industry of
America: Borat, Reality Bites, and the Construction of an Anti-SLAPP Fence Around the First
Amendment, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 639, 653–54 (2009). The defendant production
company successfully argued that several of the issues the movie invoked, particularly in the
contested scene involving several fraternity brothers, were of public interest, including issues
surrounding sexism, racism and homophobia. Id. at 654.
168. London Wright Pegs, Comment, The Media SLAPP Back: An Analysis of California’s AntiSLAPP Statute and the Media Defendant, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 323, 334–35 (2009).
169. See Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Database, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 48, 54–55 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
170. Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2010).
171. Id. at 906–08.
172. 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
173. Id. at 89. Another court, in following this approach, found Rivero to be the first case to deal
with the public-issue question systematically. Commonwealth Energy Corp. v. Investor Data Exch.,
1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
174. 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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in the same year as Rivero, analyze five principles to establish a
“somewhat more restrictive test, designed to distinguish between issues
of ‘public, rather than merely private, interest’”:175 (1) public interest
“does not equate with mere curiosity”; (2) an issue of public interest
should be of concern to a substantial number of people; (3) “there should
be some degree of closeness” between the acts at issue and the asserted
interest; (4) the focus of the speaker’s conduct should be on the public
interest, not to aid in the speaker’s own private interest; and (5) “[a]
person cannot turn otherwise private information into a matter of public
interest simply by communicating it to a large number of people.”176
The two tests have something in common: an apparent desire to reject
the theory that parochial disputes become public issues merely because
larger issues might be in play.177 For example, if a homebuyer sues a
home seller for misrepresenting square footage of a home, the seller
cannot assert that his conduct related to a matter of public interest
merely because most Americans live in, buy, and sell houses.178
The emphasis the two tests place on the widespread attention an issue
receives, however, allows a court to make fame a primary factor in an
anti-SLAPP analysis. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Paris Hilton’s image constituted an issue of public interest
under both the Rivero and Weinberg tests.179
2.

Washington Courts Have Historically Interpreted “Issue of Public
Concern” Under the Connick Test

Unlike the California statute’s protection for “issues of public
interest,” the Washington Act protects statements made in connection
with an “issue of public concern.”180 The Act’s legislative history
175. Hilton, 599 F.3d at 906 (quoting Weinberg, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 392).
176. Weinberg, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 392–93.
177. One court called this theory the “synecdoche theory of public issue.” Commonwealth
Energy, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 395. In Rivero, for example, the defendant union claimed its publication
of documents relating to the plaintiff’s supervision of eight employees applied under the statute
because workers’ criticism of unlawful workplace activity was an issue of public interest. The court
reasoned that under the union’s interpretation, “discussion of nearly every workplace dispute would
qualify,” and instead concluded that to constitute an issue of public interest, the activity must meet
“some threshold level of significance.” Rivero, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
178. See Consumer Justice Ctr. v. Trimedica Int’l, Inc., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 191, 194 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (using a similar hypothetical to explain that specific advertising statements about herbal
supplement did not fall under the anti-SLAPP statute).
179. Hilton, 599 F.3d at 907–08. Hallmark ultimately failed on the second prong of anti-SLAPP
analysis because Hilton showed a probability of prevailing on the claim. Id. at 912.
180. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West Supp. 2011) (emphasis added), with
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reveals nothing to explain this deviation from the California statute.181
By employing this “public concern” language, however, the Washington
State Legislature borrowed a phrase commonly used by Washington
courts. For the past twenty-five years, Washington courts have decided
whether speech is “of public concern” by adopting the U.S. Supreme
Court’s test from Connick v. Myers.182
In Connick, an assistant district attorney, in response to a transfer
request she opposed, circulated a questionnaire around the district office
concerning office morale, the transfer policy, the need for a grievance
committee, and the level of confidence in superiors.183 The district
attorney learned of the questionnaire and fired her. The issue before the
Court was whether the plaintiff’s expressive conduct pertained to a
matter of public concern, and therefore deserved First Amendment
protection.”184 The Court held that it did not.185
In making this determination, the Court analyzed three factors: the
content, the form, and the context of the speech.186 The Court’s analysis
of these factors has become known as the Connick test, and courts have
employed the test repeatedly to determine whether speech relates to an
issue of public concern.187
None of the three factors is individually dispositive.188 When
analyzing the content, courts look to see if the expression relates to
public, rather than private, matters.189 When analyzing the form, courts
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2) (2011) (emphasis added).
181. See supra Part III.
182. See Benjamin v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 138 Wash. 2d 506, 529, 980 P.2d 742, 754 (1999)
(Johnson, J., concurring); White v. State, 131 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 929 P.2d 396, 403–04 (1997)
(holding that “[c]ontent is the most important factor”); Meyer v. Univ. of Wash., 105 Wash. 2d 847,
851, 719 P.2d 98, 101 (1986).
183. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140–41 (1983).
184. Id. at 142. The Court held that the State “cannot condition public employment on a basis that
infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.” Id.
185. Id. at 154.
186. Id. at 147–48. The Court reviewed a long line of cases in which the Court safeguarded
speech on issues of public concern and gave lower courts this rough test. Id. at 143–46. The review
included a famous Massachusetts case in which Oliver Wendell Holmes, before he was named to
the Court, stated, “[A policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517
(Mass. 1892). One commentator has called the test “strikingly vacuous.” Cynthia Estlund, Speech
on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 34 (1990).
187. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215–17 (2011); Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–87 (1987).
188. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216.
189. Id. at 1211.
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consider whether the actor made the expression public, or if the speech
was made in a private manner, such as a note to a superior.190 And when
analyzing the context, courts often look to the purpose of the speech,
particularly whether the speech was part of a public discussion or
whether it merely served a private purpose.191 In Connick, for example,
the Court held that the fired employee’s expressive conduct was not
meant to begin a debate about work conditions, but simply to “gather
ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors.”192
Thus, it did not address an issue of public concern.193
The U.S. Supreme Court recently revisited the Connick test in Snyder
v. Phelps.194 The plaintiff’s son in Snyder, a U.S. Marine, died in Iraq in
the line of duty.195 On a public street outside the military funeral, a
Baptist church group held a protest in which it suggested that military
deaths result from the United States’ tolerance of homosexuals. The
group held signs inscribed with harshly worded condemnations of
homosexuality and phrases such as “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and
“You’re Going to Hell.”196
The father, who later saw the signs on television, filed five tort claims
and won a jury award on three.197 The church group argued that because
their activities constituted expression on an issue of public concern, the
trial court should have shielded them from tort liability.198 The Court,
after applying the Connick test, agreed. Under the first factor, the Court
found that the content of the defendants’ signs related to broad interests

190. See Markos v. City of Atlanta, 364 F.3d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that comments
made to a newspaper reporter, where it was understood that the statements would be used in a
published article, were public in nature). But cf. Terrell v. Univ. of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360,
1362–63 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that speech in a personal notebook where the writer made no
effort to communicate the contents to the public was private in nature).
191. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386. In Rankin, the Court found that when a nineteen-year-old
stated, on the day of an assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan, “if they go for him
again, I hope they get him,” she spoke on an issue of public concern. Id. at 381, 386. The Court
found that the context revealed that statement came in the course of a political conversation, on the
heels of an event that was “certainly a matter of heightened public attention: an attempt on the life
of the President.” Id. at 386.
192. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.
193. Id.
194. 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011).
195. Id. at 1213.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1214. The plaintiff’s claims for defamation and publicity given to private life were
dismissed on summary judgment, but he prevailed on his intentional infliction of emotional distress,
intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy claims. Id.
198. Id.
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of society—such as the moral conduct of Americans, the country’s fate,
and homosexuality in the military—that were of public, not private,
import.199 Although the Court did not discuss the form of the speech, it
found that the context of the protest reflected the church’s broader
attempt to condemn society, and not solely the plaintiff’s son.200
B.

The Washington Act Does Not Include California’s Public Interest
and Commercial Speech Exceptions

In 2003, the California State Legislature noticed a “disturbing” trend:
the abuse of anti-SLAPP motions by corporations, a primary target of
anti-SLAPP legislation.201 Because of the broad construction of the
statute, corporations began using anti-SLAPP motions to increase the
time and expense of plaintiff lawsuits.202 Legal seminars promoted the
use of anti-SLAPP motions in otherwise ordinary products liability and
personal injury cases.203 With this expanded corporate use, the antiSLAPP motion became its own form of legal intimidation.204 As one
dissenting justice on the California Supreme Court wrote, “[t]he cure has
become the disease.”205
The California State Legislature responded to these abuses by
creating two exceptions to the anti-SLAPP statute. The first exception
prohibits the use of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike public interest
lawsuits.206 The second prohibits anti-SLAPP motions by most corporate
defendants.207 Under the corporate defendant exception, the California

199. Id. at 1216–17. The Court found that even those signs that appeared directly targeted at the
plaintiff’s son, such as “You’re Going to Hell,” spoke to broader public issues. Id. at 1217.
200. Id. at 1217. The court did not discuss the form of the speech, although this is likely because
the form of the speech—picket signs—was unquestionably public.
201. Joshua L. Baker, Chapter 338: Another Law, Another SLAPP in the Face of California
Business, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 409, 431 (2004).
202. Id. at 414.
203. Id. at 413–14.
204. See id., supra note 201, at 419; Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 714 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
205. Navallier, 52 P.3d at 714 (Brown, J., dissenting).
206. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.17(b) (West Supp. 2011). For the purposes of the exception,
“public interest” does not apply anywhere near as broadly as it does in section 425.16. Club
Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, 196 P.3d 1094, 1099 (Cal. 2008). Courts have
found that neither a lawsuit requesting changes to the election process of the Sierra Club nor an
action by city council members to compel council meetings to adjourn by 11 p.m. constituted
lawsuits brought solely for the public interest. See id. at 1099–100; Holbrook v. City of Santa
Monica, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 181, 186–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
207. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.17(c).
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law now prohibits anti-SLAPP motions when three conditions exist: (1)
the target of the suit is “a person primarily engaged in the business of
selling or leasing goods or services”; (2) the content of the speech
targeted consists of representations or facts about the speaker’s or a
competitor’s business goods or services; and (3) the audience of the
targeted speech is an actual or potential customer or someone likely to
repeat the speech to an actual or potential customer, or the speech arose
out of a regulatory proceeding or investigation.208 In order to comply
with the anti-SLAPP statute’s broad construction, courts interpret the
exceptions narrowly.209
When it drafted the Act, the Washington State Legislature did not add
either exception.
C.

The Washington Act Punishes SLAPP Filers More Severely than
California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute

The California anti-SLAPP statute limits the sanction for filing a
SLAPP or frivolous anti-SLAPP motion to attorney’s fees. In
Washington, the Act’s drafters notably increased the amount. The
Washington Act gives SLAPP victims attorney’s fees plus a $10,000
award.210 It also grants the trial judges discretion to award “[s]uch
additional relief . . . as the court determines to be necessary to deter
repetition of the conduct and comparable conduct by others similarly
situated.”211 With this provision, the Washington Act gives trial judges
more flexibility to promote the legislature’s goal of deterring SLAPPs.

208. Id.; see Baker, supra note 201, at 418. All three conditions must exist. See Contemporary
Servs. Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 443–44 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
209. See Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, 196 P.3d 1094, 1098 (Cal. 2008).
The exceptions also have exceptions. Neither the public interest nor commercial speech exceptions
apply against three classes of cases: (1) actions against persons engaged in gathering, receiving or
processing information for communication to the public; (2) actions based upon the promotion of
any dramatic, literary, musical, political, or artistic work; (3) actions against nonprofit organizations
that receive more than 50 percent of their annual revenue from government. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 425.17(d) (West Supp. 2011).
210. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(6)(a) (2011).
211. Id. Although the original bill initially only awarded costs and fees to victims of frivolous
anti-SLAPP motions, the Senate Judiciary Committee revised the Washington Act so that those
victims receive a $10,000 award, and the trial judge may award further relief to deter repeated
frivolous motion practice.
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WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD USE THE CALIFORNIA
ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE TO DETERMINE THE LEGISLATIVE
INTENT BEHIND THE WASHINGTON ACT

Despite sparse legislative history behind the Washington Act, courts
have accepted that the drafters of the Washington Act modeled it after
California’s anti-SLAPP statute.212 One court interpreting the
Washington Act proclaimed it to be a mirror of the California law, given
the striking similarities between the two.213 But to interpret the
Washington Act as a carbon copy of the California law would ignore
critical differences in their respective texts, most of which have been
present since the Washington Act was first introduced in the Washington
State Legislature. Instead, Washington courts should use long-standing
canons of statutory construction to analyze the Act’s similarities and
differences with the California law. This careful interpretation will
reveal a specific legislative intent to adopt some California provisions
and corresponding case law while rejecting others entirely. The final
result should be a close following of the California law with an
important deviation for Washington’s definition of “issues of public
concern.” This result is consistent with the legislative text and
Washington’s traditional use of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Connick test.
A.

Interpreting Intent from the Act’s Similarities to, and Its Deviations
from, the California Anti-SLAPP Statute Is Consistent with Canons
of Statutory Interpretation

When the legislature enacts a statute, it does so to accomplish a
specific purpose, and the goal for the courts in interpreting the statute is
to divine that purpose.214 Yet the legislative process often hides that
purpose behind a veil of formality, leaving the courts little guidance to
implement that purpose properly.215 To carry out a statute’s purpose
effectively, Washington courts have established several canons of

212. See Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog Films, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1110 (2010); Castello v.
City of Seattle, No. C10-1457(MJP), 2010 WL 4857022, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 22, 2010)
(relying on California case law interpreting the California Anti-SLAPP statute to determine that the
statements at issue would fall under the protection of the Washington Anti-SLAPP Act).
213. Aronson, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
214. See Quadrant Homes v. State Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 154 Wash. 2d 224, 244, 110
P.3d 1132, 1142 (2005) (“The primary goal of statutory construction is to discern the legislature’s
intent.”).
215. Philip A. Talmadge, A New Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV
179, 179 (2001).
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statutory interpretation.216
One particular external canon that should aid courts in implementing
the purpose of the Washington Act is the borrowed statute rule. Under
the borrowed statute rule, courts find that when the legislature borrows a
statute from another jurisdiction, it implicitly adopts that jurisdiction’s
judicial interpretations of the statute.217 Similarly, where the legislature
modifies or ignores a provision of the borrowed statute, it implicitly
rejects that provision and its corresponding case law.218 The borrowed
statute rule often involves interpretation of statutes that derive from a
model act.219 The Washington State Supreme Court has found that when
the legislature deviates from a model act, it is “bound to conclude” that
the deviation “was purposeful” and evidenced an intent to reject those
aspects of the model act.220
Because the California anti-SLAPP statute served as a model for the
Washington Act, courts can use the borrowed statute rule to interpret the
Washington Act. Where the Washington State Legislature adopted the
California statute’s provisions, the Washington Act reveals an explicit
intent to embrace the interpretation of those provisions. For example,
courts should find that the Washington State Legislature intended to
adopt the California courts’ interpretation of “public forum” for the
statute’s purposes, or California’s interpretation of what constitutes
“good cause” to overcome the stay of discovery. Courts should also
interpret the Act to adopt the provisions of the California statute that
provide a procedural remedy for defendants to shield themselves from
SLAPPs,221 that offer an opportunity for plaintiffs to prove their claim
216. Id. at 180. Many of those canons are textual, in that they look solely at the words of the
statute; others are external, in that they look to outside sources to divine legislative intent. Id. at
184–85.
217. Id. at 197; see also Town of Republic v. Brown, 97 Wash. 2d 915, 917–18, 652 P.2d 955,
957 (1982); Jenkins v. Bellingham Mun. Ct., 95 Wash. 2d 574, 577–78, 627 P.2d 1316, 1318
(1981); Pac. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Pierce Cnty., 27 Wash. 2d 347, 355, 178 P.2d 351, 355
(1947). This canon, though, would not require the courts to adopt future interpretations of the other
jurisdiction, as the legislature could not have intended to adopt law it did not know existed.
218. See, e.g., Lundberg v. Coleman, 115 Wash. App. 172, 177–78, 60 P.3d 595, 599 (2002)
(“[W]hen the model act in an area of law contains a certain provision, but the Legislature fails to
adopt such a provision, our courts conclude that the Legislature intended to reject the provision.”).
219. See State v. Coria, 146 Wash. 2d 631, 650, 48 P.3d 980, 989 (2002) (“[F]ailure to include
language from the Model Penal Code in a criminal statute evidences an intent that the statute’s
meaning differs from the Model Penal Code.”); Lundberg, 115 Wash. App. at 177–78, 60 P.3d at
599 (analyzing deviations from the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act).
220. State v. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d 712, 723, 976 P.2d, 1229, 1234 (1999) (holding that the
legislature’s deviation from the model act was evidence of its intent to reject the concept of
extending accomplice liability for omissions to act).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 83–93 (explaining the two statutes’ use of a procedural
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has merit,222 and that direct the courts to apply and construe the
Washington Act broadly.223
Where the Washington Act deviates from its model statute, however,
Washington courts should conclude that the legislature intended to reject
related provisions and their corresponding case law. This is especially
true for the Washington State Legislature’s coverage of issues “of public
concern” as opposed to California’s protection of issues “of public
interest.”
B.

To Interpret the Act’s Protection of Speech Related to an “Issue of
Public Concern,” Washington Courts Should Continue to Apply
the Connick Test

By applying the statute to statements made in connection with “an
issue of public concern,” instead of adopting the California statute’s
“public interest” language, the legislature selected a phrase familiar to
the Washington courts. Washington courts, for more than twenty years,
have applied a test to determine what expression relates to issues of
public concern.224 The test, established by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1983 in Connick v. Myers and still applied today, provides a standard for
courts that would fulfill the Act’s purpose of granting further protection
to speech that lies at the heart of the freedom of expression.
The Connick test is well-suited to analyzing Washington anti-SLAPP
motions for two primary reasons.225 First, it fulfills the goals of the
Washington Act. The drafters of the Washington Act sought the same
goal as the U.S. Supreme Court when it formulated the Connick test: to
provide protection to those who express themselves on issues of public
concern. Just as the Court has found that public participation is “the

remedy).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 83–93 (explaining the two statutes’ use of a procedural
remedy).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 75–82 (explaining the two statutes’ directives for broad
construction).
224. See Benjamin v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 138 Wash. 2d 506, 529, 980 P.2d 742, 754 (1999)
(Johnson, J., concurring); White v. State, 131 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 929 P.2d 396, 403–04 (1997)
(holding that “[c]ontent is the most important factor”); Meyer v. Univ. of Wash., 105 Wash. 2d 847,
851, 719 P.2d 98, 101 (1986).
225. Rhode Island courts, interpreting an anti-SLAPP statute that similarly applies to “issues of
public concern,” have also used the Connick test. See Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette, 762
A.2d 1208, 1214 (R.I. 2000) (finding Connick test to underlie anti-SLAPP statute’s use of “issues of
public concern”); Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. NC-2008-0119, 2009 WL 3328540, at *3–5
(R.I. Sup. Ct. Aug. 27, 2009) (applying Connick test to anti-SLAPP motion).
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essence of self-government,”226 the Washington State Legislature found,
when passing the Washington Act, that “[i]t is in the public interest for
citizens to participate in matters of public concern . . . without fear of
reprisal through abuse of the judicial process.”227
Second, it fulfills those goals in a way familiar to Washington
courts.228 Washington courts already apply the Connick test to interpret
what speech is “of public concern” in federal employment law cases
similar to Connick.229 Most notably, the Supreme Court of Washington
applied the Connick test in Binkley v. City of Tacoma230 and White v.
State.231 When the legislature employs words or concepts with wellsettled common law traditions, Washington courts presume they should
follow the common law usage.232 Additionally, Washington courts
traditionally give the Connick test such a broad reading that “even the
slightest tinge of public concern is sufficient.”233 The Connick test
provides Washington courts the most direction for interpreting the
Washington Act in determining what activities are in connection with an
issue of public concern.
CONCLUSION
The Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation filled a gap in Washington’s protection of free expression
and petition rights. Although Washington previously only protected
communication with a government agency, the Washington Act now
protects a broad range of activities from lawsuits intended only to incur
costs and chill future expression. The Washington drafters patterned the
Act after the anti-SLAPP statute in California, the same state whose
constitutional right of free speech served as the basis for Washington’s

226. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).
227. 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 921.
228. This is not to suggest that Washington courts, when applying the Connick test to the antiSLAPP statute, should be bound by outcomes reached by the United States Supreme Court and
others under the test.
229. See cases cited supra note 224.
230. 114 Wash. 2d 373, 382, 787 P.2d 1366, 1373–74 (1990).
231. 131 Wash. 2d 1, 11–12, 929 P.2d 396, 403–04 (1997).
232. Talmadge, supra note 215, at 198; see In re Tyler’s Estate, 140 Wash. 679, 689, 250 P. 456,
460 (1926) (holding that in the absence of a statutory exception prohibiting a husband from
inheriting when he murdered his wife, the “maxims of the common law,” forbidding profit by fraud,
controlled).
233. White, 131 Wash. 2d at 12 n.5, 929 P.2d at 404 n.5 (quoting Binkley, 114 Wash. 2d at 383
n.8, 787 P.2d at 1373 n.8).
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constitutional right. Despite little legislative history to provide courts
guidance on why Washington chose to modify or ignore certain
provisions, the choices themselves reveal a legislative intent to reject
California’s interpretation of those provisions. One of the primary
inquiries for courts, then, will be interpreting which exercises of free
expression meet the statutory requirement of connecting to an issue of
public concern. But Washington courts need not strain far in that inquiry
because the test most suitable to fulfill the Act’s goals, the Connick test,
already possesses a firm place in Washington jurisprudence.

